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Large athletics programs bring a lot of attention to themselves and the universities 
of which they are a part. Once, that attention came only from success on the field 
or court. Now it also comes from how much money these programs spend, and on 
what, and its source. Calls to use the federal tax code to rein in athletics spending 
are, we believe, ill-advised. The IRS has limited resources and a lot to do. Its staff 
members know tax law, not the ins and outs of college athletics. Because universi-
ties are adept at “zeroing out” revenues and expenses, it is unlikely that new tax 
rules and added IRS oversight would do much to curtail spending. They could, 
however, impose significant compliance costs on universities. The result could 
be the worst of all worlds: considerable expense on universities to comply; little 
or no spending reform achieved; and an IRS diverted from core responsibilities.
Setting the Stage: Why the Reformers 
Want to Reform
Big time university athletics programs generate revenues in ways the rest of the 
university does not. Institutions in the football bowl subdivision of NCAA Division 
I (“Division I FBS”) have the largest and most well-funded athletics departments. 
They pay head football and men’s (and sometimes women’s) basketball coaches 
several multiples of the salaries paid to chaired full professors who bring in major 
research grants, to senior administrators, and sometimes even to university presi-
dents at their institutions. Increasingly in these Division I FBS programs, associate 
head football coaches and coordinators make substantially more money than full 
professors. Athletics capital projects likely would not make a list of the top 50 capital 
needs on any campus, and yet a second, or third, football practice facility gets built 
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while fixing the ceiling in the computer laboratory is put on hold. At the same time, 
the overall cost of a university education, particularly tuition, increases every year.
To those who find salary and other athletics expenditures “unseemly” when 
students are incurring heavy debt to cover college expenses and indefensible when 
those athletics expenditures are subsidized by general university funds, athletics 
spending limits are an obvious, if only partial, answer. To those who decry the level 
and content of athletics commercial and marketing efforts, curtailing athletics spend-
ing means reducing the need for these efforts. To those who worry that athletics 
programs increasingly are not integrated into the general functioning and ethos of 
the university, the level and manner of athletics spending are major impediments 
to integration. In any free-market system, those who spend more may get more. 
Translated to athletic competition, those who spend more may win more. Univer-
sity presidents may wish to limit athletics spending, particularly when it draws on 
an already strained academic budget, but may face considerable political pressure 
if their effort is seen to undercut the football team’s chances to win a conference 
or national title. Joint institutional action to cap coaching salaries would violate 
the current scope of the antitrust laws as would certain other joint efforts to limit 
spending. (Law v. NCAA, 1998).1
The Federal Income Tax and Reform
Over time there have been suggestions that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
use the federal income tax law to rein in athletics spending. Most recently, Professor 
John Colombo (2009) evaluated whether the federal income tax law might be the 
vehicle to achieve reform. He provided a clear description of how the income tax 
exemption Congress provides universities also covers their athletics departments. 
He also explained the important difference between a tax exemption such as that 
enjoyed by Division I universities2 and the NCAA3 and the so-called “unrelated 
business income tax” (UBIT).4 In brief, an exemption shelters income generated 
by an institution as part of its tax-exempt function, while the UBIT attaches to 
income generated by a business operated by the otherwise tax-exempt institution. 
For example, a hospital can be a charity exempt from federal income taxation. If 
the tax-exempt hospital sells drugs to its patients, the income generated by such 
sales is exempt from income taxation because providing drugs to patients is part 
of the hospital’s tax-exempt charitable activity. However, if the hospital operates a 
drug store open to the general public, the income generated by the public drug store 
would be unrelated business income subject to the UBIT even though the hospital 
uses the drug store revenue to support its charitable activities.
Professor Colombo first addressed arguments that the IRS should terminate 
in whole the tax-exempt status of certain universities (for example, those who pay 
coaches multimillion dollar salaries or that generate millions of dollars of revenues 
through broadcast contracts, licensing fees, and merchandise and ticket sales) or, in 
the alternative, should impose a tax on the net income from their athletic programs 
without regard to whether the income would be unrelated business income as cur-
rently understood. He demonstrated that long-standing IRS treatment of universities 
and their athletics departments—as well as the complicated organizational nature 
of a university—means that, under current law, the IRS would have little chance to 
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do either. After noting that he is a tax expert, not an expert in sports law or admin-
istration, he concluded by suggesting that Congress could institute for Division I 
institutions and their athletics programs three kinds of tax regulation (discussed 
later) that might facilitate reform efforts.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “income” is an accession to 
wealth, clearly realized, over which the recipient has complete dominion. (Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 1955). Athletics-generated revenues fit that definition. 
Professor Colombo described the current exemption for athletics revenue as “a sui 
generis exception” to general tax policy. He concluded, and we agree, that because 
university athletics income does not fit within the overall justifications offered when 
income is exempted from taxation, Congress could shift its current approach and 
impose limits on enjoyment of such an exemption without disrupting or confusing 
tax policy. Professor Colombo also concluded, and once again we agree, that for 
such a shift to take place, Congressional action would be needed. Finally, Professor 
Colombo suggested that Congress change the federal income tax law to impose 
limits on the revenue generated by major athletic programs and to require universi-
ties and the NCAA to disclose financial information related to athletics revenue. 
We do not believe that limiting revenues, or providing disclosure as advocated by 
Professor Colombo, would do much to further the goals of those who advocate 
reform (and it is unclear to us whether Professor Colombo holds out much hope 
that what he suggests would achieve significant reform). At a minimum, we think 
the goals in practice would be difficult to achieve. More fundamentally, we take 
issue with the suggestion that the tax law be used to regulate athletics revenue.
As members of a university faculty, we certainly understand that big-time 
university athletics programs create problems and significant challenges for uni-
versities, both fiscally and in maintaining the primacy of academic standards and 
the academic mission. We hold no brief for the size of coach salaries, both as an 
absolute and also when considered in the context of university salaries, and we 
worry about what the disparity signals regarding the values of higher education 
and of society generally. We note, however, that modern universities independent 
of their athletics programs are engaged in revenue-producing commercial and 
marketing activities—and necessarily so, given the increasingly limited public 
dollars supporting higher education. And, whatever the excesses, we believe that 
it is bad tax policy, and probably bad public policy as well, to use the tax law to 
try to achieve reform—acknowledging, as we must, that Congress regularly uses 
the federal tax law for just such nontax purposes.
As Professor Colombo correctly noted, Congress has never articulated a justi-
fication for excluding from taxable income revenues generated by certain charitable 
entities. He summarized arguments advanced by academic writers attempting to 
justify or at least explain the exemption:
a common theme of virtually all these theories is that charities supply some 
sort of good or service or “way of doing things” that is not replicated in the 
private market or by government—some kind of public good or quasi-public 
good that otherwise would not exist. The “good” supplied might be a specific 
item not available from the private market (e.g., symphonic music) or some-
thing as diffuse as a “nonprofit ethic” that takes a different (and presumably 
unique) approach to providing something that might otherwise be available 
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in the market—for example, a nonprofit hospital might approach patient care 
in a different manner than a for-profit one, even though the services provided 
(e.g., a heart bypass) are ultimately the same.
He concluded, correctly in our opinion, that none of these theoretical justifications 
support an exemption for revenue generated by major athletic programs and that, as a 
practical matter, “big-time college athletics revenues clearly do fit the normative tax 
base: payments for tickets sold, television and other media rights fees, advertising 
and so forth are absolutely no different from or harder to calculate than these same 
revenues flowing to professional, for-profit sports.” But if college athletics revenues 
fit no theoretical justification for an exemption, then the appropriate Congressional 
action, if action is to be taken, is to eliminate the exemption, not to tinker with it 
by creating additional rules to be administered.
We agree with Professor Colombo that, were all athletics income subject to 
the UBIT—in other words, were all athletics revenues classified as unrelated to a 
university’s mission—there might still be little revenue subject to tax. Standard-
izing the treatment of what is taxable revenue will be a problem. For example, 
some athletics departments handle their own sale of merchandise (and thus have 
revenue subject to the UBIT) while others contract out merchandise sales and 
receive royalties (not subject to tax).5 In addition, a large number of Division I FBS 
athletics departments are not self-sustaining and draw on funds from the rest of the 
university. Even those that show revenues in excess of expenses for football and 
men’s basketball would be unlikely to do so if the cost of facilities for those sports 
were allocated to them. Yet another issue, as Professor Colombo pointed out, is 
that charities are adept at “zeroing out” income from unrelated business activities.
For most, if not all, universities, individual units, including athletics depart-
ments, do not file their own tax returns. Athletics, the library, the college of arts 
and sciences, university medical services, the book store, university performing 
arts center—all these are university units that report revenues and expenses to the 
campus. The campus then organizes these into one tax return (or, in a university 
system, may send its combined revenues and expenses to the system office where 
it will be combined with the revenue and expense reports from each of the other 
campuses). With revenues and expenses merged into one big tax return, any revenues 
over expenses produced by athletics are offset by losses in other units.
Focusing on NCAA practices seen by reformers to be commercial exploitation 
of student-athletes poses a special problem.6 The vast majority of NCAA annual 
“expenditures” are simply distributions to member institutions. As Professor 
Colombo wrote, “one presumably would not want to limit such revenue sharing.”
It may well be unlikely that much tax revenue would be generated if all athletics 
revenues were subject to the UBIT. Nonetheless, these revenues should be subject 
to tax if they are the type revenue that Congress created the UBIT to address. Such 
a change would bring little solace to reformers, however. If imposing the UBIT 
would have little tax consequence to major athletics departments, then there also 
is little likelihood that the UBIT will reform conduct.
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Adjusting the Exemption as a Means to Reform: 
An Assessment of Professor Colombo’s 
Three Suggestions
Professor Colombo did not propose elimination of the exemption for athletics 
departments both because of the practical considerations listed above and also 
because of his belief, one we share, that there is little realistic possibility for 
doing so. There are 339 universities in Division I and 119 in Division I FBS. 
These universities sit in the states and congressional districts of the members of 
Congress who would have to vote to remove the exemption. Without regard to any 
“parochial” political interest that might be at play, moreover, revocation of the 
exemption could have substantial negative policy consequences. Athletics revenues 
neither are funneled solely into football and basketball nor directed primarily at 
paying big salaries and covering those expenditures at which reformers point as 
excessive. Instead, these revenues support athletics opportunities for women and, 
more generally, for nonrevenue producing sports. Not only is it unclear whether a 
tax on all athletics revenues would generate significant tax dollars, therefore, but 
there also is the specter of substantial adverse impact on nonrevenue producing 
sports, including women’s sports.
In an effort to wend a path through the tax code that reformers might follow to 
achieve at least some of their goals, Professor Colombo suggested three approaches 
Congress might implement:
 1.  Require a demonstration that a significant portion of athletics revenues 
subsidizes educational or athletics activities outside revenue-producing sports;
 2.  Impose annual limits on targeted expenditures, such as coaches’ salaries and 
recruiting trips;
 3.  Require disclosure of information related to the operation of athletic 
activities via Form 990 (the annual information return that certain tax-exempt 
organizations must file).
It is here that we have our major difference of opinion with Professor Colombo. 
If Congress concludes that public policy interests dictate action, then Congress 
should eliminate the tax exemption for athletics revenues rather than impose 
conditions on qualifying for it. The fact that Congress regularly uses the tax law 
to accomplish nontax goals begs the questions whether that practice is prudent or 
effective, particularly here, where there are practical difficulties of implementation 
related to the complicated organization of universities and the absence of standard-
ized practices consistent across them.
The primary purpose of the federal income tax is to raise revenue. Using that 
law to accomplish other goals is tempting because there is already an administra-
tive bureaucracy (the IRS) to enforce the tax law.7 If, for example, Congress wants 
to encourage homeowners to save energy by insulating their homes, offering a tax 
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credit to help pay the cost of insulation seems on its face sensible. The use of that 
credit will be policed not by an administrative agency expert in energy savings, 
however, but by an administrative agency expert in enforcing tax law. The IRS is 
not equipped to determine whether adding a particular type of insulation to a par-
ticular home will increase energy efficiency. The best the IRS can do is to attempt 
to determine whether those taking the credit satisfy the technical rules established 
by Congress. In that regard, keep in mind that the national audit rate on individual 
income tax returns is currently hovering around one percent. In other words, the 
IRS will not examine most returns claiming the tax credit, thus increasing the risk 
that a significant number of homeowners may use the tax credit without satisfying 
the requirements for it. Of course, an alternative to using a tax credit to encourage 
insulation would be to establish a new federal bureaucracy to process requests for 
direct payments (or reimbursements) of some of the costs of insulation. Thus, the 
question, at least in the abstract, is whether the cost of setting up a new agency 
outweighs the problems of using the tax law to encourage insulation. Unfortunately, 
there is little evidence that Congress has weighed these costs before using the tax 
law to achieve nontax goals.
The same sorts of issues will be present a hundred-fold if Congress elects 
to regulate major college athletics by imposing conditions on the exemption of 
income. One problem is the complicated relationships that athletics departments 
(and other units) have with their parent universities and the consequent lack of stan-
dardization of university organization across institutions. Although a few athletics 
departments are separate tax entities, most are not. Many have their own officer 
for business and finance; others use services provided by the university. Most but 
not all use the services of university general counsel. No university of which we 
are aware allocates to their constituent units the cost to the university of providing 
such services. Universities differ in whether they allocate scholarship revenues 
to an athletics department or other constituent unit and, if they do, whether they 
allocate in whole or in part. Some include athletics ticket costs in student fees; 
many do not. Where fees include tickets, some universities retain the entire fee, 
while others share a portion of the fee with the athletics department. Universities 
may or may not require that the cost of a new athletics facility be expensed during 
the first year of operation rather than amortized over its useful life. Universities 
treat revenues from game parking differently (and differ whether there even are 
revenues generated by parking). The lack of standardization at the university level 
is replicated within athletics departments. Consider, among others, services such 
as sports information, sports medicine, trainers and training facilities. These could 
be allocated per sport (or per student-athlete use) or to the department itself.
Although the IRS has developed expertise in regulating tax-exempt charitable 
organizations through application of the tax law, that expertise comes at significant 
cost. To regulate college athletics programs effectively, the IRS likely would need 
to impose some standard ways of organizing and reporting revenues. In a free-
market system, it is not easily possible to regulate a little, or to pick and choose 
areas to regulate, particularly as human beings are adept at modifying conduct 
to respond to new rules and yet continue to achieve their base-line objectives. To 
impose a detailed one-size-fits-all-model on a multitude of entities that differ in 
a multitude of ways carries considerable risk of inefficiency and additional costs 
for the entity. To impose broad-based standardization permits universities to adjust 
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their operations in ways that do not greatly increase administrative burdens but 
also may avoid tax consequences.
Even to begin to monitor athletics revenues, the IRS would need a staff of 
employees with sufficient knowledge to provide regular and meaningful oversight. 
IRS personnel working on college athletics programs would be unavailable to work 
on other tax matters. In a world in which Congress asks the IRS to do more with 
less, we do not believe the IRS should be asked to dedicate significant resources 
to enforce tax rules that seek to regulate the operation of major athletic programs. 
The question is not so much whether the IRS could do so, but whether it is prudent 
for it to take on such a narrow project.
In addition to our general disagreement with using tax law to achieve public 
policy reform of college athletics spending, we have specific concerns addressed 
to each of Professor Colombo’s suggestions:
1. Required Demonstration that a Significant Portion 
of Athletics Revenues Subsidize Educational or Athletics 
Activities Outside Revenue-Producing Sports.
Professor Colombo described this suggestion as addressing the claim made by 
universities that their major athletic programs subsidize other athletic programs 
that could not survive on their own, thus serving a charitable purpose. We have no 
quarrel with the notion that universities should be held to do what they say they 
do. Existing legal, NCAA, and practical constraints on the operation of athletics 
programs, however, already mean that at least for Division I FBS institutions—the 
situs of the vast majority of expenditures identified as abuses by reformers—sig-
nificant redistribution occurs. Title IX gender equity rules mandate equality in 
services and facilities provided to male and female athletes. For most institutions, 
Title IX results in the provision of varsity athletics opportunities to women athletes 
proportionate to their enrollment numbers.8 (See Cohen v. Brown University, 1993). 
Institutions also undergo periodic audits by outside entities to assure compliance. 
Because it is rare that a women’s sport produces revenue, Title IX already requires 
a substantial outlay of funds—in other words, redistribution—to programs other 
than football or men’s basketball.
One of the largest expenses of a sport, moreover, is scholarships. To compete in 
Division I FBS, an institution must sponsor at least 16 sports and offer at least 50% 
of the maximum number of scholarships permitted in 14 of them. (NCAA Bylaw 
20.9.7.1). In practice, the Division I FBS institutions paying the large coach salaries 
typically sponsor more than 16 sports and also fully fund scholarships for each sport 
sponsored. Another large cost is coach salaries. Budget for salaries is a function 
both of the amount of salary paid and the number of coaches employed. NCAA 
bylaws dictate the maximum number of coaches per sport. At the Division I FBS 
level, coaching positions rarely go unfilled. Other team costs relate to the expense 
of equipment (e.g., gymnastics apparatus, upkeep of the natatorium). Team travel 
budgets, as another example, vary with distance to competition. Method of travel 
is constrained to some extent by a university’s class and exam schedule. Although 
athletics departments in theory could require teams to bus to all competition sites, 
no matter the distance, athletics directors, faculty, and university administrators 
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are sensitive to student well-being and reasonable treatment and, in any event, the 
impact on missed class days would foreclose much of such a practice.
If, despite the issues we have noted, Congress were to decide to require proof 
of redistribution, then we urge that Congress write the rules rather than delegate 
the authority to the IRS. Asking the IRS to develop the expertise to write such rules 
is just not sensible. The question to be resolved is what sort of proof Congress 
should require.
Professor Colombo would have “universities conducting Division I football or 
basketball programs . . . spend at least 5% of their total investment in these programs 
(or 5% of the annual revenues from these programs) to support non-revenue athletic 
opportunities or other clearly-academic activities.” He did not specify whether fail-
ure to satisfy the five percent requirement should cause loss of the tax exemption 
for the revenues from such programs or imposition of an excise tax similar to that 
imposed by Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 4942. The five percent figure 
apparently comes from IRC Section 4942, which requires private foundations to 
spend at least five percent of their asset value per year on charitable programs or face 
an excise tax penalty. Congress concluded that the five percent requirement would 
prevent private foundations from stockpiling funds. (H.R. Rep. No. 413, 1969).
Most, if not all, Division I FBS athletic programs already exceed a five-percent 
redistribution. In any event, we are far from certain that a five-percent requirement 
would ensure the sort of revenue redistribution that the reformers seek or end or 
even limit the current perceived abuses. For example, suppose a Division I athlet-
ics program generates $50 million in revenue each year (a modest amount for an 
FBS institution; Ohio State, Texas, and several others have budgets at least double 
$50 million). Five percent of $50 million is $2,500,000, a significant sum but not 
one that would automatically preclude paying the basketball coach $4,000,000 
or $5,000,000 per year, particularly as these salaries may be subsidized in ways 
that might not constitute revenue to the institution. For example, a coach might 
receive income paid directly to him from a radio or television broadcast contract 
or a product manufacturer. If the goal is to require universities to do what they 
say they do in terms of redistribution, Congress would need to base the amount of 
required redistribution on something other than an arbitrary percentage of assets 
or revenues. Determining what that should be may, itself, be more difficult than 
would be worth the cost of regulation.
2. Impose Annual Limits on Targeted Expenditures, 
Such as Coaches’ Salaries and Recruiting Trips.
This proposal has a certain appeal because it relates directly to perceived abuses 
under current law. However, as Professor Colombo conceded, there is much debate 
over whether salaries for executives and employees of charitable organizations 
should be lower than they would be in the for-profit sector. Further, as he also 
concedes, the attempt, in IRC Section 162(m), to encourage limits on executive 
compensation by limiting the employer’s deduction for such compensation has 
failed because the deduction cap does not take into account incentive-based com-
pensation. We note that incentive-based compensation (e.g., $100,000 when a team 
wins a national championship and $50,000 for a conference championship) is a 
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commonplace in head coach contracts. Professor Colombo argued that, whatever the 
potential difficulty, college athletics may be a suitable case for expenditure limits, 
particularly with respect to recruiting budgets and coaches’ salaries and perks. 
Because there are so many noneconomic, noncharitable reasons to prize football or 
basketball success, there are few incentives for most schools to adequately police 
whether they are getting value for money from these expenditures.
Professor Colombo used as his model IRC Section 501(c)(3) limitations on 
tax exempt organizations. These limit spending on lobbying and impose excise tax 
penalties for, among others, political activity expenditures, excess business invest-
ments and so-called “jeopardizing investments.” Significantly, these provisions are 
narrowly targeted and do not involve compensation of employees. Because the 
most notable concern in connection with university athletic programs has been 
compensation of coaches and because there is significant opposition to attempts to 
limit such compensation, we doubt that Congress would pass legislation imposing 
a salary cap. Even if Congress were to consider such a cap, creating an effective 
cap might be difficult because, as described above, a coach’s overall compensation 
might include funds from outside the university.
Professor Colombo also suggested that annual limits might be imposed on 
expenditures for recruiting and athletic facilities. We agree that Congress might 
use the tax law for this purpose, but to do so would raise at least two questions.
First, how would Congress describe the limitation? A limitation based on a 
percentage of revenue generated by the program might be the easiest limitation 
for the IRS to administer, but, as noted above, would be arbitrary and also might 
be ineffective. A limitation that would require the IRS to evaluate the “reasonable-
ness” of a particular university’s expenditures would create the type enforcement 
problem we described when discussing use of the tax law to achieve nontax goals. 
For example, recruiting budgets vary with the geographical location of an insti-
tution and its attractiveness to elite prospects. They might prefer to be in warm 
weather, near the beach, in a large city with myriad entertainment options, or in a 
major media market. The more “built-in” advantages to some athletics programs, 
the more need for other programs to spend money to offset them. Similarly, high-
profile programs with long traditions and BCS ties pose recruiting challenges to 
programs attempting to break into the “elite” ranks.
Second, expenditure limitations would have to be enforced either by imposi-
tion of an excise tax or loss of tax-exempt status. A tax-exempt university is not 
interested in a deduction for a coach’s salary. If the enforcement mechanism is an 
excise tax, a university might accept the tax as part of the cost of hiring the best 
coach. Congress might avoid that problem by making the rate of the excise tax high 
enough, but it is not clear how high that tax rate would have to be to achieve the 
result, particularly with a seeming endless stream of boosters with deep pockets 
happy to underwrite coach salaries and other major expenditures. The other alter-
native is for Congress to authorize the IRS to terminate the privilege of treating a 
university’s athletics program as tax exempt. That penalty may seem draconian, 
but remember that the university has the burden of establishing that it is entitled 
to tax-exempt status in general and that the revenue of a major university athletic 
program has no tax policy claim to exemption. If Congress is unwilling to authorize 
withdrawal of the tax exemption, then this is yet another reason why Congress 
should not start down this path at all.
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3. Require Disclosure of Financial and Academic Information 
Related to the Operation of Athletic Activities via IRS 
Form 990.
From the perspective of the IRS, a disclosure requirement is the most workable of 
Professor Colombo’s three proposals because it uses an existing mechanism (IRS 
Form 990), an information tax return filed by organizations exempt from federal 
income taxation under IRC Section 501(c)(3), and would not (if Congress specifies 
what must be reported) involve the IRS in extensive rule making. Even if the IRS 
did not review all the reported information, its availability for public inspection 
might have the effect reformers desire.
However, athletics departments already disclose a significant amount of infor-
mation and it is unclear to us what additional disclosure Professor Colombo would 
require. Athletics programs report substantial information to the Department of 
Education under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act and also submit revenue 
and expense information to the NCAA. The NCAA reports information, although 
in the aggregate. In addition, a public university’s submission to the NCAA may 
be subject to disclosure under a state’s open records act. Over the past several years 
the NCAA, in conjunction with the National Association of College and University 
Business Officers (NACUBO), has developed certain “benchmark indicators” in 
an effort to develop data that may be compared across institutions. Benchmark 
indicator data specific to an institution are distributed to that institution along 
with information that permits some comparison with designated peer institutions.
Despite the benchmark indicator data, comparisons among Division I insti-
tutions are difficult. Consider sports information as one example. Because of, 
among other things, squad size, public interest, media attention, and number and 
geographical distribution of media outlets that cover a sport, sports information 
staff and resources are not evenly distributed across sports. Are the expenses of a 
sports information department allocable to the athletics department or should they 
be allocated to each individual sport? If to the department, does that not understate 
the costs of staff and other resources devoted to football, for example? What about 
facilities? If the athletics director and senior athletics staff are officed in the facility 
with the football stadium, which facility expenses are attributable to football? On the 
revenue side, are skybox rentals fully allocable to football even though the skybox 
is used by its occupant on other than game days? Although the NCAA/NACUBO 
benchmark indicator project has produced some level of comparative data, major 
differences in organization and accounting methods and practices still remain.9
In addition, IRS Form 990 currently is required only of entities tax exempt 
under IRC Section 501(c)(3). Although some public universities are tax exempt 
under IRC Section 501(c)(3) and thus have an obligation to file Form 990, many 
others are tax exempt only under IRC Section 115(1). If, therefore, Congress chooses 
to require universities to report additional information despite the concerns noted 
above, Congress would need to extend the obligation to file a Form 990 to those 
public universities currently covered only by IRC Section 115(1).
As with Professor Colombo’s suggestion to limit certain annual expenditures, 
discussed above, a final significant question would be what penalty to impose for 
failure to comply with the disclosure requirement. Here we believe that the only 
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penalty with teeth is termination of the tax-exempt status of athletics departments. 
And again, if Congress determines this is too draconian a penalty to apply, then 
Congress should not start down this regulatory path.
Conclusion
Although many suggest the use of the federal tax code to regulate and curtail col-
lege athletics spending, there has been little informed discussion as to how this 
might be done, with what effect, and at what cost. Professor Colombo deserves 
much commendation for bringing the full discussion into the forefront. He identi-
fies as a barrier to informed discussion the fact that the tax knowledge of reform-
ers “has appeared woefully inadequate.” In offering a lucid explanation of current 
law governing tax-exempt status and the UBIT and the substantial impediments 
to adjusting current law to achieve reform, he fully achieves his goal of educating 
on how the tax law applies. He also achieves his goal of explaining tax policy and 
the “standard theoretical paradigm for exemption.” We read his three proposals on 
the possible uses of federal tax law in connection with reform of major university 
athletic programs as intended only as suggestions on how the tax code might be used 
by reformers who remain intent that it should be used. We count ourselves squarely 
among the growing crescendo of concerned voices—from faculty, tuition-paying 
parents, members of Congress, and the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate 
Athletics, among others—that athletics spending increasingly is out of whack and 
threatens core university values and operations. While we disagree that the federal 
tax code should be used for policy purposes unrelated to generating revenues, our 
main concern is that any reform be undertaken with care. Public funds to support 
higher education are waning and universities are increasingly strapped to support 
their operations. The worst possible eventuality is one where universities are put to 
considerable cost to comply with new rules conditioning the exercise of an exemp-
tion for athletics spending and yet little or no reform is achieved.
Notes
1.  In Law v. NCAA, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals found that an NCAA bylaw that created 
a coach position with a cap on salary (“restricted earnings coach”) violated the antitrust laws.
2.  Public universities are exempt from federal income tax under IRC Section 115(1) because 
they involve the “exercise of [an] essential governmental function.” Professor Colombo notes 
that, notwithstanding the exemption under IRC Section 115(1), “many public universities request 
recognition of exemption under [IRC Section] 501(c)(3) simply to avoid confusion in the minds 
of potential donors and because grants from private foundations are often limited to ‘charitable’ 
organizations.”
3.  The NCAA is exempt from federal income taxation under IRC Section 501(c)(3).
4.  The UBIT is described in IRC Section 511. It applies to state universities covered by IRC 
Section 115(1) as well as to universities and other organizations covered by IRC Section 501(c)
(3). See IRC Section 511(a)(2).
5.  See IRC Section 512(b)(2) (excluding all royalties from the unrelated business income).
6.  The bulk of NCAA revenues is derived from media contracts for coverage of the Division 
I Men’s Basketball Championship.
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7.  Using the tax law to accomplish nontax goals also may be tempting to Congress because 
the cost is “off budget.” The tax revenue lost as a result of offering an energy tax credit would not 
show up as a line item in federal budget documents. The cost of administering a direct program 
would show up in the budget documents.
8.  With regard to athletics competition, there are three ways to meet gender equity under Brown: 
(1) varsity participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers 
substantially proportionate to male and female enrollment numbers, (2) an institution has “a 
history and continuing practice” of adding women’s sports that reflects the athletics interest and 
abilities of women, or (3) the athletics interest and abilities of women are “fully and effectively” 
accommodated. In addition, gender equity requires rough equivalence in services and facilities 
for male and female athletes includes equipment and supplies; scheduling of games and practice 
times; travel and per diem allowances; coaching and academic tutoring; assignment and com-
pensation of coaches and tutors; locker rooms, practice and competition facilities; medical and 
training facilities and services, housing and dining facilities and services, and sports information 
services. 34 C.F.R. Section 106.41(c) (1992).
9.  One possibility to aid standardization is to secure information in the way that IRS Form 
1120 (the corporate income tax return) does it for, among other things, foreign trusts and foregone 
income. Very specific questions would need to be asked that account for every variation that a 
university might employ. Take concessions, for example. The form would need to ask whether an 
athletics department has concessions at athletics events and, if so, whether concessions are handled 
by the athletics department, by the parent university concessions operation, or outsourced. We 
owe this suggestion to Nancy Kenny, Associate Athletics Director for Business and Finance at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Nancy also is due a big thank you for honing our appreciation 
of the complex, nonstandard relationship of athletics department and universities.
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